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ABSTRACT Most existing biometric systems designed for healthcare applications only use biometrics
for authentication/access control without considering its other function—data encryption. In this paper,
we propose a cancelable finger-vein-based bio-cryptosystem, which not only can provide authentication but
also can encrypt sensitive healthcare data through a biometric cryptographic technique, fuzzy commitment
scheme (FCS). The proposed bio-cryptosystem stores both the encrypted version of healthcare data and the
biometric template on a smart card for the reason that it is safer if the biometric data never leaves the card.
The employment of the cancelable biometrics further enhances the system security. The experimental results
and security analysis show the validity of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Biometrics, security, healthcare, data security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [1] and Australia Privacy Principles Act (APPA) [2]
have requirements for protecting patients’ privacy and per-
sonal information, which may contain treatments received,
life style details, family medical history, medications pre-
scribed and lots of other information pertinent to the patients’
health [3]. Moreover, health data can be shared among
different health information systems within one organiza-
tion or across different healthcare organizations [4]. The
information exchange/sharing process increases the risk of
disclosing patients’ healthcare data. This needs to be taken
into account during the development of an electronic health
record system, because some patients are concerned that their
electronic healthcare data might be easily accessed or com-
promised by unauthorized individuals for inappropriate or
even unlawful purposes rather than for proper medical use.
Hence, the protection of patients’ privacy as well as safe
access and retrieval of patients’ information is vitally impor-
tant in the design of a modern healthcare information system.
In an information sharing scenario, controlling who is
accessing the information is a time-consuming and com-
plex task. Accurate patient authentication/identification is
the most critical step in this task [5], since it is the key to
ensuring right care delivered to the right patient and that the
patient’s medical records are up to date, accurate and properly
shared across systems [3]. Traditional authentication in the
healthcare sector is through passwords. Passwords are simple
to use and deploy; however, passwords are also considered
to be an extremely poor form of protection. It is reported
that 80% of security incidents are related to poorly chosen
passwords [6]. For example, some passwords are simple com-
binations of well-known numbers, e.g., 123456, or date of
birth, or telephone extension, which are easy to guess and
breach [7].
In comparison to passwords, biometrics, which is a biolog-
ical measurement technology, uses the unique nature of some
physical or behavioral traits of human beings for verification
and/or identification1. Biometric technology is being pushed
forward to replace traditional ways of authentication, such
as passwords and tokens, which are physical devices for
authentication [8] 1. The fact that biometric traits cannot be
forgotten or lost and are hard to forge enables them to bemore
secure than traditional authentication. Many biometric traits
can be defined from a human body. Examples of biometric
traits include fingerprint, face, iris, voice and so on. They
can be generally classified into two categories, physiological
traits and behavior traits, as shown in Figure 1. Each of them
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has its strengths and weaknesses, and plays a unique role in
some specific applications [9], [10].
FIGURE 1. Classification of biometric traits (adapted from [15]).
Among all the biometric recognition systems, fingerprint-
based recognition systems are the most extensively stud-
ied and most widely deployed. On the surface of a finger,
the pattern of ridges and valleys has been determined in
the first few months and even identical twins own differ-
ent patterns [8]. The recognition performance, measured by
equal error rate (EER) [11], of fingerprint-based recognition
systems has been reported to be pretty good [11]. Finger-
vein is another unique trait related to one’s fingers and can
be used to identify individuals. Finger-vein develops inside
fingers and the collection of finger-vein images is touch-less,
therefore it is not prone to external distortion suffered by
fingerprint during the image acquisition process. Also, finger-
vein does not leave latent prints on any object surface like
fingerprint. Moreover, a finger-vein recognition model can
come with liveness detection that senses flow of blood in
veins [12]–[14], which makes finger-vein a promising trait
for biometric systems.
This paper focuses on the design of a finger-vein based
bio-cryptosystem built for smart cards. The proposed bio-
cryptosystem considers not only the security of healthcare
data but also the security of the biometric template itself.
In addition, the proposed scheme strikes a good balance
between security and matching performance. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, biomet-
ric applications in the healthcare industry are reviewed and
comparatively analyzed. In Section III, the new cancelable
finger-vein, smart card based bio-cryptosystem is proposed.
In Section IV, the experimental results and security analysis
of the proposed system are provided. The conclusions and
future research directions are given in Section V.
II. RELATED STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION OF EXISTING WORK
A patient’s healthcare data should be available to all medical
professionals who have the right to access the data so that
they can perform their duties. Healthcare data security and
patients’ privacy are the major concerns in an information
sharing process, where the healthcare data are operated by
multiple users and may be corrupted in the sharing channels.
The maintenance of healthcare data security is costly and
complex. To achieve a good balance between the security
requirement and the availability of healthcare data, when
designing a security mechanism, we should consider such
factors as security, efficiency and user friendliness [4].
Biometric recognition techniques provide reliable user
authentication to ensure that only authorized personnel can
access patients’ healthcare data [16]. Biometric systems can
also facilitate remote access to healthcare data [17] by using
biometric features as a tool of authentication. For example,
in [18], Bao et al. introduced a physiological signal, heart rate
variability (HRV) based entity authentication scheme specific
for a body area sensor network (BASN), which is a basic
component in the healthcare systems. In [19], Krawczyk
and Jain designed and implemented an authentication sys-
tem based on voice and signature data. The proposed sys-
tem helps medical facilities comply with the HIPAA stan-
dards regarding protection and privacy of medical records.
The voice and signature modalities are combined at the
matching score level and the weighted sum rule are uti-
lized. Garson and Adams [7] developed a system architec-
ture for data encryption and access control in an e-hospital
environment. In this architecture, a two-factor authentication
mechanism is introduced for improving security. One factor
is the username and password system, and the other factor
is fingerprint biometrics. However, the cost of a two-factor
authentication mechanism may be higher than a single-factor
authentication mechanism. In [20], the authors proposed to
use both encryption and authentication for tele-healthcare
communication. The benefits of combining static biometrics,
e.g., fingerprint, and dynamic biometrics, e.g., electrocardio-
gram (ECG), are discussed. In [4] and [21], the authors ana-
lyzed the advantages and disadvantages of using biometric
technology in the healthcare industry. The biometric tech-
nology is compared with traditional identification methods,
e.g., passwords, to determine the core benefits and shortcom-
ings. Andreeva [22] first discussed the problem of human
authentication in the BASN (body area sensor network), and
then proposed the heart sound based biometric technique as
an authentication solution. Díaz-Palacios et al. [23] gave an
insight on how to combine hardware and software method-
ologies with biometrics to preserve patients’ privacy while
retrieving the health information of the patients. Specifi-
cally, a mobile device embedded with a fingerprint reader
is designed to capture and send the fingerprint of the patient
from an emergency scene to a central database. If biometric
matching is successful, the patient’s health information will
36940 VOLUME 6, 2018
W. Yang et al.: Securing Mobile Healthcare Data: Smart Card-Based Cancelable Finger-Vein Bio-Cryptosystem
be returned to the mobile device. Being token-free is the obvi-
ous advantage of this approach, while other methods require
the patient to carry a token. He et al. [24] proposed a tri-factor
to achieve user authentication for the BASN for healthcare
application. In the tri-factor method, the user’s password,
smart card and ECG, are utilized as three factors to enhance
the security and accuracy of identity authentication. In [25],
Azeta et al. designed a CareMed Hospital Information Sys-
tem (HIMS), which uses PIN and fingerprint as two-factor
authentication to secure patients’ health records. In [26],
to safeguard the cloud based electronic health record (EHR),
the authors provided a comprehensive solution with a cryp-
tographic role based technique. It distributes session keys to
establish communications and with location and ECG based
biometrics, it authorizes users. Apart from being used for
authentication, ECG is treated as the host to embed the HER
data securely by steganography.
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING WORK
In the aforementioned systems, most of them use biometrics
as a single factor or one of multiple factors, e.g., fingerprint,
passwords and smart card, to offer authentication and access
control. In these systems, the role of the biometric modality
is to conduct matching between the template and query, to
generate a verdict of success or failure. If matching is success-
ful, the user is granted the right to access the corresponding
healthcare data. We illustrate a general framework of such a
biometric based authentication system in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. A general framework of a basic biometric based
authentication system.
A fundamental drawback of this framework is that the
biometric modality only allows the user to gain system access
based on the matching result, but it does not provide further
protection to healthcare data. In [4], the idea of biometric
cryptography is proposed to further increase the security of
sensitive information. The biometric modality is used to gen-
erate or release a cryptographic key for encrypting sensitive
healthcare data. Therefore, the biometric modality can be uti-
lized not only for access authorization or identity verification
but also for protecting sensitive health related information.
C. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
The idea of biometric encryption for healthcare data pro-
posed in [4] can obviously increase the security of sensi-
tive information compared with the existing biometric sys-
tems, e.g., [18]–[26], which are only designed for authentica-
tion/access control purposes. However, the concept proposed
in [4] did not aim to include design details and experimen-
tal tests to validate the idea. Existing biometric systems in
healthcare applications do not consider the security of the
biometric modality itself. It is well known that losing one’s
biometric data can have serious consequences of identity
abuse and privacy invasion. There is a gap in literature to
examine issues such as feature selection, performance and
security analysis of biometric encryption for healthcare data.
To fill the above gap, in this paper we propose a cancelable
finger-vein, smart card based bio-cryptosystem to encrypt
sensitive healthcare data while securing the original biometric
data themselves. The main contributions of the proposed
system are summarized below:
1. The proposed system is equipped with the functions
of both authentication and data encryption via a cryp-
tographic key which is bound and secured by the
biometric template. This is a clear improvement over
the existing biometric systems in healthcare industry
applications, because existing systems only have the
function of user authentication.
2. We propose to store both sensitive healthcare data and
biometric template data on a smart card. With health-
care data and biometric template data stored centrally
in a database and shared in multiple systems, sensitive
data misuse and theft is a growing concern for the
healthcare industry. To resolve this problem, the smart
card can be designed to store as well as match the
biometric data on the card. Since the biometric template
never leaves the card, access to it is prevented during
transmission, which greatly helps to reduce the risk of
information leakage.
3. The cancelable template technique is employed in the
proposed system. One major concern over the use
of biometrics is the permanence of a biometric trait.
When biometrics in one application is compromised,
any other applications in which the same biometrics
is enrolled are exposed. With the properties of revo-
cability and diversity, cancelable biometrics employed
can effectively protect biometric template data across
various applications.
III. PROPOSED CANCELABLE FINGER-VEIN, SMART
CARD BASED BIO-CRYPTOSYSTEM
To secure sensitive healthcare data and finger-vein biometric
features, we develop a finger-vein, smart card based can-
celable bio-cryptosystem. The system includes two phases:
the data encryption phase and data decryption phase. In the
setup process, three types of data: the helper data, hash value
of secret key and the encrypted healthcare data, are first
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FIGURE 3. The proposed cancelable finger-vein, smart card based bio-cryptosystem.
generated in the data encryption phase. Specifically, sensitive
healthcare data is encrypted by using a secret key. To protect
the secret key, template finger-vein features are extracted and
transformed to establish the transformed template, which is
technically bound with the secret key by the well-known bio-
metric cryptography technique, fuzzy commitment scheme
(FCS). In the data decryption phase, query finger-vein fea-
tures are extracted and transformed in the same way as the
template. The query is further input to the decoder of FCS
to retrieve the secret key. If the query is close enough to the
template, key retrieval will be successful. With the retrieved
secret key, healthcare data can be correctly decrypted. The
proposed system is shown in Figure 3. Also some parameters
and their descriptions used in this paper are listed in Table I.
TABLE 1. Some parameters and their descriptions.
A. FINGER-VEIN FEATURE EXTRACTION
1) FEATURE EXTRACTION
Finger-vein feature extraction has been extensively researched.
The same steps used in [12] are applied in our system for the
detection and enhancement of the finger-vein image region
of interest (ROI) area. The ROI is cropped into the size of
256×96 pixels. The technique of Gabor filter has been proven
to be a powerful tool for image-based feature extraction [27].
According to [27], a family of 40 (=5×8) Gabor filters of five
scales and eight orientations are constructed; refer to [27] for
the details of the Gabor filter construction. The 256×96 pixel
finger-vein image is processed by all the 40 filters. Each
Gabor filter (GF) generates a feature string fg(i) and by
concatenating all the 40 feature strings, we obtain a full Gabor
feature vector fg = fg(1)‖fg(2)‖ . . . ‖fg(39)‖fg(40)‖ of length
983040 (=256×96×40). It can be seen that this feature vector
fg resides in a high-dimensional space. A mature dimen-
sionality reduction technique, Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) [28], is employed. PCA is capable of generating a
subspace of an original vector and retaining most information
about the original vector [29]. After the dimension reduction
with PCA, a finger-vein feature vector fv of length Nv is
generated. The process of the finger-vein feature extraction
is demonstrated in Figure 4.
2) FINGER-VEIN FEATURE TRANSFORMATION AND
BINARIZATION
Raw finger-vein features need protection. Security and
privacy concerns arise to both biometric template data
and sensitive healthcare data when raw finger-vein features
are compromised. To protected raw finger-vein features,
we resort to cancelable biometrics, which is initiated by
Ratha et al. [30]. The core idea of cancelable biometrics
is to transform the original biometric template with a non-
invertible transformation function into a new version, so that
the transformed biometric template instead of the original one
is generated and stored [31], [32]. If the transformed template
is compromised, the original template will not be recovered
and the transformed template can be revoked and replaced
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FIGURE 4. The process of finger-vein feature extraction.
by just changing a parameter key. By doing so, the original
biometric template and the associated system are safe [33].
To irreversibly transform the extracted finger-vein feature
vector fv of length Nv, the random projection based transfor-
mation is used. Specifically, the feature vector fv is projected
onto a random space with the guidance of the random pro-
jection matrixM of size Nb × Nv, where Nb < Nv. The non-
invertible transformation process can be compactly expressed
as:
fc =M× fv (1)
where fc is the inner product ofM and fv. Equation (1) makes
the dimension of the transformed feature vector fc reduced
from Nv to Nb. In our application, Nv is set to be 399 and
Nb ∈ {255, 63} by considering the system performance and
security.
The elements of fc are real-valued and therefore unsuitable
for the subsequent processing of the FCS (fuzzy commitment
scheme) [34], [35], which requires the input to be in the
binary format. To convert the feature vector fc into the binary
format, each element fc(i), i ∈ [1,Nb], is converted to a binary
value fb(i) by:
fb(i) =
{
1 if fc(i) > δ
0 if fc(i) ≤ δ (2)
where δ is a threshold and is set to be 0 in our application.
Using Equation (2), we get the binary feature vector fb =
[0, 0, 1, . . . , 1, 1, 0] of length Nb. The process of feature
transformation and binarization is demonstrated in Figure 5.
B. SECRET KEY BINDING AND RETRIEVAL
Obviously, both the sensitive healthcare data D and the bio-
metric template feature vector f Tb (the superscript T stands
for ‘template’) contain crucial information, so they cannot
be stored on a smart card without protection. In traditional
cryptography, D can be protected by a secret key K together
FIGURE 5. The process of finger-vein feature transformation and
binarization.
with a data encryption function, as Dˆ = Fe(D,K ). However,
the secret key K itself needs protection since it plays the
most important role in the protection of D. We apply the FCS
(fuzzy commitment scheme) [34] to the protection of both
the secret key K and the biometric template feature vector
f Tb by technically binding them together. Fuzzy commitment
scheme is a combined technique of error-correction code and
cryptography. It can conceal and bind a secret in a way that
makes it is infeasible for an adversary to learn the secret.
With its error correction characteristic, it is useful in bio-
metric authentication systems, in which the biometric data is
subject to random noises/errors. By using FCS in biometric
application, it is hard to restore either the secret key or the
biometric template without any knowledge of the user’s bio-
metric data [35]. In this way, both the healthcare data D and
the biometric template feature vector f Tb are secured. Hence,
the secret key binding and retrieval procedures are the critical
steps, which are detailed below.
1) SECRET KEY BINDING
The healthcare data encryption is provided by the FCS
based on the error correction code, ‘‘Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem’’ (BCH) code [36], with (n, k, t) parameter
settings, where n is the codeword length, k is the secret key
length and t is the correctable error length. The BCH encoder
(Enc) module converts the secret keyK into its corresponding
codeword C ∈ {0, 1}n, as C = Enc(K ), where K ∈ {0, 1}k
is the secret key and is as long as k bits. The codeword C is
then bound with the binary template vector f Tb through the
XOR operation creating the offset H as helper data, H =
C ⊕ f Tb , where⊕ is the XOR operation [37]. The helper data
H together with the hash value hash(K ) of K are stored on
the smart card.
2) SECRET KEY RETRIEVAL
The healthcare data decryption relies on whether the secret
key used for encryption can be retrieved correctly. The secret
key retrieve process equals to the authentication process.
If the secret key can be retrieved successfully, the authentica-
tion is passed and the user can correctly decrypt the encrypted
healthcare data.
In the decryption step, a query finger-vein vector, f Qb
(the superscript Q stands for ‘query’) is generated by the
same steps as the template feature vector f Tb . Hereafter, the
helper data H is XOR-ed with f Qb , resulting in the possible
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compromised codeword C∗ = H ⊕ f Qb = C ⊕ (f Tb ⊕ f Qb ) =
C ⊕ e, where the hamming distance ε = d(f Tb , f Qb ) = ‖e‖
is the number of errors compromising the codeword C [37].
By using the decoder (Dec) module of FCS, a candidate
key K∗ is recovered, as K∗ = Dec(C∗). If the hash value
hash(K∗) of K∗ is equal to the hash value hash(K ) of K ,
it means that K is equal to K∗. This happens only when the
hamming distance between the template feature vector f Tb and
query feature vector f Qb is smaller or equal to the error cor-
recting capability of the BCH code, i.e., ε = d(f Tb , f Qb ) ≤ t,
where d(·) is a function calculating the hamming distance.
Therefore, to successfully retrieve the secret key K , the query
feature vector f Qb must be close enough to the template feature
vector f Tb within t bits of difference.
After the secret key K is retrieved correctly, it is further
supplied into the data decryption function Fd (·), of which
the encrypted healthcare data Dˆ can be decrypted to D, as
D = Fd (Dˆ,K ).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We carry out experiments to evaluate the proposed cance-
lable finger-vein, smart card based bio-cryptosystem by using
a public finger-vein database included in the Homologous
Multi-modal Traits Database (FV-HMTD) [38]. The chosen
finger-vein database involves finger-vein images from 106
users. Six images are acquired from each of six fingers
(index finger, middle finger and ring finger of both hands)
of each user. So a total of 106×6=636 different fingers with
six finger-vein images per finger are collected. Each finger-
vein image is of size 320×240 pixels. In our experiments,
the first four finger-vein images of each finger from the first
100 fingers are used for training and the remaining twofinger-
vein images of each finger are used for testing.
The evaluation of the proposed system is based on three
indices, False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection
Rate (FRR) and the Equal Error Rate (EER), which is the
error rate when the FAR is equal to FRR. To obtain the value
of FRR, the fifth image is considered as the template and
the sixth image from the same finger is used as the query.
To obtain the value of FAR, the fifth image of each finger
is considered as the template and the fifth image from other
fingers is used as the query. To avoid correlation, if an image
a has been compared with an image b, then the symmetric
comparison, e.g., b against a, is not performed. Therefore,
a total of 100 genuinematching tests and 4950 (=100×99÷2)
imposter matching tests are performed [39].
We first evaluated the system performance before and after
cancelable transformation. The finger-vein feature vector fv,
which is extracted from a finger-vein image by the Gabor
filter and PCA techniques, is set to be Nv = 399 in length
before cancelable transformation. After random projection
based cancelable transformation, the resulting finger-vein
feature vector is fc with a length of Nb. As mentioned in
Section III, two different parameter values Nb ∈ {255, 63}
are applied in our experiments.
Template-query matching tests are conducted by using the
feature vectors before and after cancelable transformation,
respectively. Since the feature-vein feature vectors fv and
fc are in the format of real-value, the similarity between
them can be calculated to see if the template and query data
match. Assume f T = f Tv or f Tc is the feature vector extracted
from a template image, and f Q = f Qv or f Qc is the feature
vector extracted from a query image. The similarity score
between f T and f Q is calculated as follows
STQ = 1−
‖f T − f Q‖2
‖f T ‖2 + ‖f Q‖2 (3)
where ‖ · ‖2 represents 2-norm and the similarity score STQ
is in the range [0, 1]. 0 means that two feature vectors are
totally different and 1 means they are exactly the same. The
corresponding system performance under different parameter
settings is shown in Figure 6.
FIGURE 6. The system performance before and after cancelable
transformation.
From Figure 6, we can see that matching performance
decreases after cancelable transformation. The feature vector
length before cancelable transformation is Nv = 399, which
corresponds to the matching performance of EER=2%; after
random projection based cancelable transformation, the per-
formance decreases to be EER=3% with the feature vector
length Nb = 255, and further decreases to be EER=3.77%
with the feature vector length shortened toNb = 63. Different
values of Nv and Nb determine the size of random projection
matrix M, which is of size Nb × Nv. The random projection
based cancelable transformation is a many-to-one projection,
the smaller the Nb value is, the less information from the
original feature vector is kept after transformation. In this
situation, the discriminative power of the feature vector will
decrease and cause poorer matching performance, as verified
by the experiments above. However, with less information
kept from the original feature vector, it is harder for the
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adversary to reverse from fc to fv, which translates into higher
security of the template.
To further evaluate the system performance, the FRR and
FAR values are examined. Recall that the BCH code used in
FCS is described by the triplet (n, k, t). To strike a balance
between security and performance, we choose the BCH codes
from a list of possible triplet values. System performance is
investigated with different BCH codes. For a fixed n, which
is set to be the same as Nb, FAR and FRR for different values
of t are computed and shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. It is
straightforward to observe that for the same n value, e.g.,
n=63 or 255, when t is small, the FAR is small, but FRR is
high. Some of the (n, k, t) BCH codes and their corresponding
FAR and FRR are listed in Table II. A smaller value of t
corresponds to a longer key length k of secret key K . For
example, if the key length is k=13, the system performance is
FRR=8% with FAR=0. When the key length is increased to
be k=47, the system performance is FRR=24%with FAR=0.
FIGURE 7. The system performance under different t when n=255.
TABLE 2. The system performance with different parameter settings.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The main objective of the proposed bio-cryptosystem is to
protect sensitive healthcare data stored on the smart card.
In contrast to the traditional key-based cryptographic scheme,
in which healthcare data protection relies on keeping the key
secret, our proposed system seamlessly bound the key with
the template finger-vein features by FCS. Without the query
FIGURE 8. The system performance under different t when n=63.
features from the same user, it is difficult to retrieve the secret
key.
Oneway to retrieve the key is through brute force attack. Its
computational complexity equals to the key length k, which is
a variable in the range of 7-63 bits, Different k values imply
different system performance. In our testing, we chose the
(n, k, t) BCH code to be (255, 47, 42) BCH code, which
can provide protection to a 47 bit secret key with the system
performance of FRR=24% when FAR=0.
Another way to compromise the secret key is by attacking
the FCS. In FCS, the k bit secret key K is mapped to a
n bit codeword C of an (n, k, t) BCH code. The template
finger-vein feature vector f Tb and the codeword C are XOR-
ed to generate helper data H , as H = C ⊕ f Tb . When the
smart card is stolen, all the internal data inside the smart card
including the helper data H can be revealed. Given the (n, k,
t) BCH code, by the sphere-packing bound [40], the rough
lower bound on the difficulty facing the adversary, who has
obtained the helper data H and attempts to reconstruct the
feature vector f Tb , is equal to the entropy of f
T
b by a given H .
This is expressed in Equation (4).
H∞(f Tb |H ) = log2
(
2n/
(
n
t
))
(4)
If feature vector f Tb is known, then the key K is no longer
deemed secret. With a specific BCH code, e.g., (255, 47, 42)
BCH code, of which n=255, t=42, the security provided by
FCS to the feature vector f Tb is 94 bits calculated by Equa-
tion (4). We can see that in this case, the adversary actually
requires more effort than directly brute force attacking the
secret keyK , whose computational complexity is only 47 bits
under the (255, 47, 42) BCH code.
One motivating reason for an adversary to capture the
feature vector f Tb is that if the same feature vector f
T
b from
the same user is used for different applications, then the
adversary can use the restored feature vector f Tb to launch
cross matching attacks to the user’s private data in other
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applications. However, it is impossible in the proposed sys-
tem thanks to the cancelable template design we adopt. The
reason is that the feature vector f Tb is a transformed, non-
invertible version of the original feature vector f Tv . Under
the guidance of transformation matrixM, a different feature
vector f Tb can be easily generated by just changing the seed for
M. Through this method, the possibility of launching cross
matching attacks can be eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Due to their advantages, biometric authentication systems
have increasingly become the preferred means to identity
authentication in the healthcare sector. In this paper, we have
proposed a cancelable finger-vein, smart card based bio-
cryptosystem. The proposed system not only can perform
authentication but also provide data encryption to sensitive
healthcare data, which has not previously been proposed in
the existing biometric systems for healthcare industry. Also,
the idea of storing both the biometric template and sensitive
healthcare data on the smart card can avoid information leak-
age during data exchange or biometric template transforma-
tion, because biometric template data never leaves the card.
Moreover, the employment of cancelable biometrics further
enhances system security.
For future work, we will explore other more stable bio-
metrics, e.g., iris, to obtain high-quality biometric features
for better data protection. We will also investigate the fusion
of multiple biometric traits so as to design multi-biometric
systems for the healthcare sector, which will provide stronger
security and better recognition accuracy.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Hu, H.-H. Chen, and T.-W. Hou, ‘‘A hybrid public key infrastructure
solution (HPKI) for HIPAA privacy/security regulations,’’ Comput. Stan-
dards Interfaces, vol. 32, nos. 5–6, pp. 274–280, 2010.
[2] D. Wright and C. Raab, ‘‘Privacy principles, risks and harms,’’ Int. Rev.
Law, Comput. Technol., vol. 28, pp. 277–298, 2014.
[3] O. F. Segun and F. B. Olawale, ‘‘Healthcare data breaches: Biometric
technology to the rescue,’’ Int. Res. J. Eng. Technol., vol. 4, no. 11,
pp. 946–950, 2017.
[4] A. E. F. Zuniga, K. T.Win, andW. Susilo, ‘‘Biometrics for electronic health
records,’’ J. Med. Syst., vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 975–983, 2010.
[5] B. Spence. (2011). Hospitals can Finally Put a Finger on Biometrics.
Accessed: Jun. 22, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.
securityinfowatch.com/article/10473265/hospitals-can-finally-put-a-
finger-on-biometrics
[6] G. C. Kessler. Disponível por, MAIO. (1999). Passwords-Strengths and
Weaknesses. http://www.hill.com/library/staffpubs/password.html
[7] K. Garson and C. Adams, ‘‘Security and privacy system architecture for an
e-hospital environment,’’ in Proc. 7th Symp. Identity Trust Internet, 2008,
pp. 122–130.
[8] A. K. Jain, P. Flynn, and A. A. Ross, Handbook of Biometrics. New York,
NY, USA: Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[9] W. Yang, J. Hu, J. Yang, S. Wang, and L. Shu, ‘‘Biometrics for securing
mobile payments: Benefits, challenges and solutions,’’ in Proc. 6th Int.
Congr. Image Signal Process. (CISP), 2013, pp. 1699–1704.
[10] W. Yang, J. Hu, C. Fernandes, V. Sivaraman, and Q. Wu, ‘‘Vulnerability
analysis of iPhone 6,’’ in Proc. 14th Annu. Conf. Privacy, Secur. Trust
(PST), 2016, pp. 457–463.
[11] FVC-onGoing. Accessed: Jun. 22, 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://biolab.csr.unibo.it/FVCOnGoing/UI/Form/Home.aspx
[12] S. J. Xie, S. Yoon, J. Yang, Y. Lu, D. S. Park, and B. Zhou, ‘‘Feature
component-based extreme learning machines for finger vein recognition,’’
Cogn. Comput., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 446–461, 2014.
[13] S. J. Xie, Y. Lu, S. Yoon, J. Yang, and D. S. Park, ‘‘Intensity variation
normalization for finger vein recognition using guided filter based singe
scale retinex,’’ Sensors, vol. 15, no. 7, pp. 17089–17105, 2015.
[14] W. Yang, J. Hu, and S. Wang, ‘‘A finger-vein based cancellable bio-
cryptosystem,’’ in Network and System Security. Berlin, Germany:
Springer, 2013, pp. 784–790.
[15] S. R. Kodituwakku, ‘‘Biometric authentication: A review,’’ Int. J. Trend
Res. Develop., vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 113–123, 2015.
[16] W. Atkins, ‘‘A bill of health for biometrics?,’’ Biometric Technol. Today,
vol. 8, no. 9, pp. 8–11, 2000.
[17] Y. Shin, Y. Lee, W. Shin, and J. Choi, ‘‘Designing fingerprint-recognition-
based access control for electronicmedical records systems,’’ inProc. 22nd
Int. Conf. Adv. Inf. Netw. Appl.-Workshops (AINAW), 2008, pp. 106–110.
[18] S.-D. Bao, Y.-T. Zhang, and L.-F. Shen, ‘‘Physiological signal based entity
authentication for body area sensor networks and mobile healthcare sys-
tems,’’ in Proc. IEEE-EMBS 27th Annu. Int. Conf. Eng. Med. Biol. Soc.,
Jan. 2005, pp. 2455–2458.
[19] S. Krawczyk and A. K. Jain, ‘‘Securing electronic medical records using
biometric authentication,’’ in Audio- and Video-Based Biometric Person
Authentication. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2005, pp. 435–444.
[20] G. H. Zhang, C. C. Y. Poon, and Y. T. Zhang, ‘‘A biometrics based security
solution for encryption and authentication in tele-healthcare systems,’’ in
Proc. 2nd Int. Symp. Appl. Sci. Biomed. Commun. Technol. (ISABEL),
2009, pp. 1–4.
[21] H. Jhaveri, H. Jhaveri, and D. Sanghavi, ‘‘Biometric security system and its
applications in healthcare,’’ Int. J. Tech. Res. Appl., vol. 2, no. 6, pp. 15–20,
2014.
[22] E. Andreeva, ‘‘Alternative biometric as method of information security of
healthcare systems,’’ in Proc. 12th Conf. FRUCT Assoc., Oulu, Finland,
2011, p. 5.
[23] J. R. Díaz-Palacios, V. J. Romo-Aledo, and A. H. Chinaei, ‘‘Biometric
access control for e-health records in pre-hospital care,’’ in Proc. Joint
EDBT/ICDT Workshops, 2013, pp. 169–173.
[24] C.-G. He, S.-D. Bao, and Y. Li, ‘‘A novel tri-factor mutual authentication
with biometrics for wireless body sensor networks in healthcare applica-
tions,’’ Int. J. Smart Sens., Intell. Syst., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 910–931, 2013.
[25] A. A. Azeta, D.-O. A. Iboroma, V. I. Azeta, E. O. Igbekele, D. O. Fatinikun,
and E. Ekpunobi, ‘‘Implementing a medical record system with biomet-
rics authentication in E-health,’’ in Proc. IEEE AFRICON, Sep. 2017,
pp. 979–983.
[26] U. Premarathne et al., ‘‘Hybrid cryptographic access control for cloud-
based EHR systems,’’ IEEE Cloud Comput., vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 58–64,
Jul./Aug. 2016.
[27] V. Štruc and N. Pavešic, ‘‘The complete Gabor-Fisher classifier for robust
face recognition,’’ EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process., vol. 2010, p. 26,
May 2010.
[28] K. Delac,M.Grgic, and S. Grgic, ‘‘Independent comparative study of PCA,
ICA, and LDA on the FERET data set,’’ Int. J. Imag. Syst. Technol., vol. 15,
no. 5, pp. 252–260, 2005.
[29] M. Turk and A. Pentland, ‘‘Eigenfaces for recognition,’’ J. Cognit. Neu-
rosci., vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 71–86, 1991.
[30] N. K. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. H. Connell, and R. M. Bolle, ‘‘Generating
cancelable fingerprint templates,’’ IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell.,
vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 561–572, Apr. 2007.
[31] S. Wang, G. Deng, and J. Hu, ‘‘A partial Hadamard transform approach to
the design of cancelable fingerprint templates containing binary biometric
representations,’’ Pattern Recognit., vol. 61, pp. 447–458, Jan. 2017.
[32] S. Wang and J. Hu, ‘‘A blind system identification approach to cancelable
fingerprint templates,’’ Pattern Recognit., vol. 54, pp. 14–22, Jun. 2016.
[33] S. Wang, W. Yang, and J. Hu, ‘‘Design of alignment-free cancelable
fingerprint templates with zonedminutia Pairs,’’ Pattern Recognit., vol. 66,
pp. 295–301, Jun. 2017.
[34] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, ‘‘A fuzzy commitment scheme,’’ in Proc. 6th
ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur., 1999, pp. 28–36.
[35] A. Teoh and J. Kim, ‘‘Secure biometric template protection in fuzzy
commitment scheme,’’ IEICE Electron. Exp., vol. 4, no. 23, pp. 724–730,
Dec. 2007.
[36] R. Chien, ‘‘Cyclic decoding procedures for Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem codes,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-10, no. 4,
pp. 357–363, Oct. 1964.
[37] E. J. C. Kelkboom, J. Breebaart, T. A. M. Kevenaar, I. Buhan, and
R. N. J. Veldhuis, ‘‘Preventing the decodability attack based cross-
matching in a fuzzy commitment scheme,’’ IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 107–121, Mar. 2011.
36946 VOLUME 6, 2018
W. Yang et al.: Securing Mobile Healthcare Data: Smart Card-Based Cancelable Finger-Vein Bio-Cryptosystem
[38] Y. Yin, L. Liu, and X. Sun, ‘‘SDUMLA-HMT: A multimodal biometric
database,’’ in Proc. Chin. Conf. Biometric Recognit., 2011, pp. 260–268.
[39] W. Yang, J. Hu, S. Wang, and M. Stojmenovic, ‘‘An alignment-free finger-
print bio-cryptosystem based on modified Voronoi neighbor structures,’’
Pattern Recognit., vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1309–1320, 2014.
[40] F. MacWilliams and N. Sloane, The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 1977.
WENCHENG YANG is currently a Post-Doctoral
Researcher with the Security Research Institute,
Edith Cowan University, Australia. His major
research interest is in biometric security and
pattern recognition. He has published several
high-quality papers in high ranking journals and
conferences, such as the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, and Pattern
Recognition.
SONG WANG received the Ph.D. degree from
the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engi-
neering, The University of Melbourne, Australia.
She is currently a Senior Lecturer with the Depart-
ment of Electronic Engineering, La Trobe Univer-
sity, Australia. Her research areas are biometric
security, blind system identification and wireless
communications.
JIANKUN HU is currently a Full Professor with
the School of Engineering and IT, University of
New South Wales, Canberra, Australia. His main
research interest is in the field of cyber security,
including image processing/forensics andmachine
learning, where he has authored many papers in
high-quality conferences and journals, including
the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS AND
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE. He has served on the Edi-
torial Board of up to seven international journals,
including the top venue IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND
SECURITY and served as the Security Symposium Chair of IEEE flagship
conferences of the IEEE ICC and the IEEE Globecom. He has received
seven Australian Research Council (ARC) Grants and has served at the
prestigious Panel of Mathematics, Information and Computing Sciences,
ARC The Excellence in Research for Australia Evaluation Committee.
GUANGLOU ZHENG was a telecommunication
system R&D engineer with the Nanjing R&D
Center, ZTE Corporation, Nanjing, China. He is
currently a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with
the Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan
University, Perth, WA, Australia. His research
interests include wireless network security, med-
ical system security, biometrics, IoT security,
ECG signal processing, spacecraft orbit determi-
nation, GPS/GNSS, and precise navigation and
positioning technologies.
JUNAID CHAUDHRY (SM’17) is currently an
Assistant Professor with the College of Security
and Intelligence, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni-
versity, Prescott, AZ, USA. He has authored three
books, over 50 research papers, and holds sev-
eral patents. He is a Senior Member the High
Technology Crime Investigation Association, the
Australian Computing Society, and the Australian
Information Security Association, and frequently
volunteers his time for public speaking events,
conference organization, and editing of scientific journals.
ERWIN ADI received the B.Sc. degree in com-
puter science from The State of New York at
Stony Brook, NY, USA, in 1992, the M.Sc. degree
in communications technology from the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde, Glasgow, U.K., in 1998, and
the Ph.D. degree in computer science from Edith
Cowan University, Perth, Australia, in 2017. He
served for six years giving lectures in network
and Web security with Bina Nusantara University,
Jakarta, Indonesia, where his students went to the
final stage of a national hacking competition. He is currently a Post-Doctoral
Researcher with the University of New South Wales, Australia, under the
Australian Centre for Cyber Security research group. One of his publications
proposed a novel method that adapts the architecture of human immune
system to detect cyber attacks. He received the Dean’s List Award (top 2%
student of the university) from The State of New York at Stony Brook for
3 semesters and was invited to join the Golden Key National Honor Society.
CRAIG VALLI is currently the Director of the
Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan Univer-
sity, and a Professor of Digital Forensics. He is
also the current Research Director of the Aus-
tralian Cyber Security Research Institute. He has
over 30 years of experience in the ICT industry
and consults to industry and government on cyber
security and digital forensics issues. He has over
100 peer-reviewed academic publications in cyber
security and digital forensics. His main research
and consultancy is focused on securing networks and critical infrastructures,
detection of network borne threats and forensic analysis of cyber security
incidents. He is also a fellow of the Australian Computer Society. He is the
Director of the Australian Computer Society Centre of Expertise in Security
at ECU. He is also the Vice President of the High Tech Crime Investigators
Association (Australian Chapter) and a member of the INTERPOL Cyber
Crime Experts Group.
VOLUME 6, 2018 36947
